Zionism and the Third Reich
Early in 1935, a passenger ship bound for Haifa in Palestine
left the German port of Bremerhaven. Its stern bore the Hebrew
letters for its name, "Tel Aviv," while a swastika banner fluttered
from the mast. And although the ship was Zionist-owned, its captain
was a National Socialist Party member. Many years later a traveler
aboard the ship recalled this symbolic combination as a
"metaphysical absurdity." (1) Absurd or not, this is but one
vignette from a little-known chapter of history: The wide-ranging
collaboration between Zionism and Hitler's Third Reich.
Common Aims
Over the years, people in many different countries have wrestled
with the "Jewish question": that is, what is the proper role of
Jews in non-Jewish society? During the 1930s, Jewish Zionists and
German National Socialists shared similar views on how to deal with
this perplexing issue. They agreed that Jews and Germans were
distinctly different nationalities, and that Jews did not belong in
Germany. Jews living in the Reich were therefore to be regarded not
as "Germans of the Jewish faith," but rather as members of a
separate national community. Zionism (Jewish nationalism) also
implied an obligation by Zionist Jews to resettle in Palestine, the
"Jewish homeland." They could hardly regard themselves as sincere
Zionists and simultaneously claim equal rights in Germany or any
other "foreign" country.
Theodor Herzl
Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), the founder of modern Zionism,
maintained that anti-Semitism is not an aberration, but a natural
and completely understandable response by non-Jews to alien Jewish
behavior and attitudes. The only solution, he argued, is for Jews
to recognize reality and live in a separate state of their own.
"The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in noticeable
numbers," he wrote in his most influential work, The Jewish State.
"Where it does not exist, it is brought in by arriving Jews ... I
believe I understand anti-Semitism, which is a very complex
phenomenon. I consider this development as a Jew, without hate or
fear." The Jewish question, he maintained, is not social or
religious. "It is a national question. To solve it we must, above
all, make it an international political issue ..." Regardless of
their citizenship, Herzl insisted, Jews constitute not merely a
religious community, but a nationality, a people, a Volk. (2)
Zionism, wrote Herzl, offered the world a welcome "final solution
of the Jewish question." (3)
Six months after Hitler came to power, the Zionist Federation of
Germany (by far the largest Zionist group in the country) submitted
a detailed memorandum to the new government that reviewed
German-Jewish relations and formally offered Zionist support in
"solving" the vexing "Jewish question." The first step, it
suggested, had to be a frank recognition of fundamental national
differences: (4)
Zionism has no illusions about the difficulty of the Jewish
condition, which consists above all in an abnormal occupational
pattern and in the fault of an intellectual and moral posture not
rooted in one's own tradition. Zionism recognized decades ago that
as a result of the assimilationist trend, symptoms of deterioration
were bound to appear ...
Zionism believes that the rebirth of the national life of a
people, which is now occurring in Germany through the emphasis on
its Christian and national character, must also come about in the
Jewish national group. For the Jewish people, too, national origin,
religion, common destiny and a sense of its uniqueness must be of
decisive importance in the shaping of its existence. This means
that the egotistical individualism of the liberal era must be
overcome and replaced with a sense of community and collective
responsibility ...
We believe it is precisely the new [National Socialist] Germany
that can, through bold resoluteness in the handling of the Jewish
question, take a decisive step toward overcoming a problem which,
in truth, will have to be dealt with by most European peoples
...
Our acknowledgment of Jewish nationality provides for a clear
and sincere relationship to the German people and its national and
racial realities. Precisely because we do not wish to falsify these
fundamentals, because we, too, are against mixed marriage and are
for maintaining the purity of the Jewish group and reject any
trespasses in the cultural domain, we -- having been brought up in
the German language and German culture -- can show an interest in
the works and values of German culture with admiration and internal
sympathy ...
For its practical aims, Zionism hopes to be able to win the
collaboration of even a government fundamentally hostile to Jews,
because in dealing with the Jewish question not sentimentalities
are involved but a real problem whose solution interests all
peoples and at the present moment especially the German people
...
Boycott propaganda -- such as is currently being carried on
against Germany in many ways -- is in essence un-Zionist, because
Zionism wants not to do battle but to convince and to build ...
We are not blind to the fact that a Jewish question exists and
will continue to exist. From the abnormal situation of the Jews
severe disadvantages result for them, but also scarcely tolerable
conditions for other peoples.
The Federation's paper, the Jüdische Rundschau ("Jewish
Review"), proclaimed the same message: "Zionism recognizes the
existence of a Jewish problem and desires a far-reaching and
constructive solution. For this purpose Zionism wishes to obtain
the assistance of all peoples, whether pro- or anti-Jewish,
because, in its view, we are dealing here with a concrete rather
than a sentimental problem, the solution of which all peoples are
interested." (5) A young Berlin rabbi, Joachim Prinz, who later
settled in the United States and became head of the American Jewish
Congress, wrote in his 1934 book, Wir Juden ("We Jews"), that the
National Socialist revolution in Germany meant "Jewry for the
Jews." He explained: "No subterfuge can save us now. In place of
assimilation we desire a new concept: recognition of the Jewish
nation and Jewish race." (6)
Active Collaboration
On this basis of their similar ideologies about ethnicity and
nationhood, National Socialists and Zionists worked together for
what each group believed was in its own national interest. As a
result, the Hitler government vigorously supported Zionism and
Jewish emigration to Palestine from 1933 until 1940-1941, when the
Second World War prevented extensive collaboration. '
Even as the Third Reich became more entrenched, many German
Jews, probably a majority, continued to regard themselves, often
with considerable pride, as Germans first. Few were enthusiastic
about pulling up roots to begin a new life in far-away Palestine.
Nevertheless, more and more German Jews turned to Zionism during
this period. Until late 1938, the Zionist movement flourished in
Germany under Hitler. The circulation of the Zionist Federation's
bi-weekly Jüdische Rundschau grew enormously. Numerous Zionist
books were published. "Zionist work was in full swing" in Germany
during those years, the Encyclopaedia Judaica notes. A Zionist
convention held in Berlin in 1936 reflected "in its composition the
vigorous party life of German Zionists." (7)
The SS was particularly enthusiastic in its support for Zionism.
An internal June 1934 SS position paper urged active and
wide-ranging support for Zionism by the government and the Party as
the best way to encourage emigration of Germany's Jews to
Palestine. This would require increased Jewish self-awareness.
Jewish schools, Jewish sports leagues, Jewish cultural
organizations -- in short, everything that would encourage this new
consciousness and self-awareness - should be promoted, the paper
recommended. (8)
SS officer Leopold von Mildenstein and Zionist Federation
official Kurt Tuchler toured Palestine together for six months to
assess Zionist development there. Based on his firsthand
observations, von Mildenstein wrote a series of twelve illustrated
articles for the important Berlin daily Der Angriff that appeared
in late 1934 under the heading "A Nazi Travels to Palestine." The
series expressed great admiration for the pioneering spirit and
achievements of the Jewish settlers. Zionist self-development, von
Mildenstein wrote, had produced a new kind of Jew. He praised
Zionism as a great benefit for both the Jewish people and the
entire world. A Jewish homeland in Palestine, he wrote in his
concluding article, "pointed the way to curing a centuries-long
wound on the body of the world: the Jewish question." Der Angriff
issued a special medal, with a Swastika on one side and a Star of
David on the other, to commemorate the joint SS-Zionist visit. A
few months after the articles appeared, von Mildenstein was
promoted to head the Jewish affairs department of the SS security
service in order to support Zionist migration and development more
effectively. (9)
The official SS newspaper, Das Schwarze Korps, proclaimed its
support for Zionism in a May 1935 front-page editorial: "The time
may not be too far off when Palestine will again be able to receive
its sons who have been lost to it for more than a thousand years.
Our good wishes, together with official goodwill, go with them."
(10) Four months later, a similar article appeared in the SS paper:
(11)
The recognition of Jewry as a racial community based on blood
and not on religion leads the German government to guarantee
without reservation the racial separateness of this community. The
government finds itself in complete agreement with the great
spiritual movement within Jewry, the so-called Zionism, with its
recognition of the solidarity of Jewry around the world and its
rejection of all assimilationist notions. On this basis, Germany
undertakes measures that will surely play a significant role in the
future in the handling of the Jewish problem around the world.
A leading German shipping line began direct passenger liner
service from Hamburg to Haifa, Palestine, in October 1933 providing
"strictly kosher food on its ships, under the supervision of the
Hamburg rabbinate." (12)
With official backing, Zionists worked tirelessly to "reeducate"
Germany's Jews. As American historian Francis Nicosia put it in his
1985 survey, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question: "Zionists
were encouraged to take their message to the Jewish community, to
collect money, to show films on Palestine and generally to educate
German Jews about Palestine. There was considerable pressure to
teach Jews in Germany to cease identifying themselves as Germans
and to awaken a new Jewish national identity in them." (13)
In an interview after the war, the former head of the Zionist
Federation of Germany, Dr. Hans Friedenthal, summed up the
situation: "The Gestapo did everything in those days to promote
emigration, particularly to Palestine. We often received their help
when we required anything from other authorities regarding
preparations for emigration." (14)
At the September 1935 National Socialist Party Congress, the
Reichstag adopted the so-called "Nuremberg laws" that prohibited
marriages and sexual relations between Jews and Germans and, in
effect, proclaimed the Jews an alien minority nationality. A few
days later the Zionist Jüdische Rundschau editorially welcomed the
new measures: (15)
Germany ... is meeting the demands of the World Zionist Congress
when it declares the Jews now living in Germany to be a national
minority. Once the Jews have been stamped a national minority it is
again possible to establish normal relations between the German
nation and Jewry. The new laws give the Jewish minority in Germany
its own cultural life, its own national life. In future it will be
able to shape its own schools, its own theatre, and its own sports
associations. In short, it can create its own future in all aspects
of national life ...
Germany has given the Jewish minority the opportunity to live
for itself, and is offering state protection for this separate life
of the Jewish minority: Jewry's process of growth into a nation
will thereby be encouraged and a contribution will be made to the
establishment of more tolerable relations between the two
nations.
Georg Kareski, the head of both the "Revisionist" Zionist State
Organization and the Jewish Cultural League, and former head of the
Berlin Jewish Community, declared in an interview with the Berlin
daily Der Angriff at the end of 1935: (16)
For many years I have regarded a complete separation of the
cultural affairs of the two peoples [Jews and Germans] as a
pre-condition for living together without conflict... I have long
supported such a separation, provided it is founded on respect for
the alien nationality. The Nuremberg Laws ... seem to me, apart
from their legal provisions, to conform entirely with this desire
for a separate life based on mutual respect... This interruption of
the process of dissolution in many Jewish communities, which had
been promoted through mixed marriages, is therefore, from a Jewish
point of view, entirely welcome.
Stephen S. Wise
Zionist leaders in other countries echoed these views. Stephen
S. Wise, president of the American Jewish Congress and the World
Jewish Congress, told a New York rally in June 1938:
"I am not an American citizen of the Jewish faith, I am a Jew...
Hitler was right in one thing. He calls the Jewish people a race
and we are a race." (17)
The Interior Ministry's Jewish affairs specialist, Dr. Bernhard
Lösener, expressed support for Zionism in an article that appeared
in a November 1935 issue of the official Reichsverwaltungsblatt:
(18)
If the Jews already had their own state in which the majority of
them were settled, then the Jewish question could be regarded as
completely resolved today, also for the Jews themselves. The least
amount of opposition to the ideas underlying the Nuremberg Laws
have been shown by the Zionists, because they realize at once that
these laws represent the only correct solution for the Jewish
people as well. For each nation must have its own state as the
outward expression of its particular nationhood.
In cooperation with the German authorities, Zionist groups
organized a network of some forty camps and agricultural centers
throughout Germany where prospective settlers were trained for
their new lives in Palestine. Although the Nuremberg Laws forbid
Jews from displaying the German flag, Jews were specifically
guaranteed the right to display the blue and white Jewish national
banner. The flag that would one day be adopted by Israel was flown
at the Zionist camps and centers in Hitler's Germany. (19)
Himmler's security service cooperated with the Haganah, the
Zionist underground military organization in Palestine. The SS
agency paid Haganah official Feivel Polkes for information about
the situation in Palestine and for help in directing Jewish
emigration to that country. Meanwhile, the Haganah was kept well
informed about German plans by a spy it managed to plant in the
Berlin headquarters of the SS. (20) Haganah-SS collaboration even
included secret deliveries of German weapons to Jewish settlers for
use in clashes with Palestinian Arabs. (21)
In the aftermath of the November 1938 "Kristallnacht" outburst
of violence and destruction, the SS quickly helped the Zionist
organization to get back on its feet and continue its work in
Germany, although now under more restricted supervision. (22)
Official Reservations
German support for Zionism was not unlimited. Government and
Party officials were very mindful of the continuing campaign by
powerful Jewish communities in the United States, Britain and other
countries to mobilize "their" governments and fellow citizens
against Germany. As long as world Jewry remained implacably hostile
toward National Socialist Germany, and as long as the great
majority of Jews around the world showed little eagerness to
resettle in the Zionist "promised land," a sovereign Jewish state
in Palestine would not really "solve" the international Jewish
question. Instead, German officials reasoned, it would immeasurably
strengthen this dangerous anti-German campaign. German backing for
Zionism was therefore limited to support for a Jewish homeland in
Palestine under British control, not a sovereign Jewish state.
(23)
A Jewish state in Palestine, the Foreign Minister informed
diplomats in June 1937, would not be in Germany's interest because
it would not be able to absorb all Jews around the world, but would
only serve as an additional power base for international Jewry, in
much the same way as Moscow served as a base for international
Communism. (24) Reflecting something of a shift in official policy,
the German press expressed much greater sympathy in 1937 for
Palestinian Arab resistance to Zionist ambitions, at a time when
tension and conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was
sharply increasing. (25)
A Foreign Office circular bulletin of June 22, 1937, cautioned
that in spite of support for Jewish settlement in Palestine, "it
would nevertheless be a mistake to assume that Germany supports the
formation of a state structure in Palestine under some form of
Jewish control. In view of the anti-German agitation of
international Jewry, Germany cannot agree that the formation of a
Palestine Jewish state would help the peaceful development of the
nations of the world." (26) "The proclamation of a Jewish state or
a Jewish-administrated Palestine," warned an internal memorandum by
the Jewish affairs section of the SS, "would create for Germany a
new enemy, one that would have a deep influence on developments in
the Near East." Another SS agency predicted that a Jewish state
"would work to bring special minority protection to Jews in every
country, therefore giving legal protection to the exploitation
activity of world Jewry." (27) In January 1939, Hitler's new
Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, likewise warned in
another circular bulletin that "Germany must regard the formation
of a Jewish state as dangerous" because it "would bring an
international increase in power to world Jewry." (28)
Hitler himself personally reviewed this entire issue in early
1938 and, in spite of his long-standing skepticism of Zionist
ambitions and misgivings that his policies might contribute to the
formation of a Jewish state, decided to support Jewish migration to
Palestine even more vigorously. The prospect of ridding Germany of
its Jews, he concluded, outweighed the possible dangers. (29)
Meanwhile, the British government imposed ever more drastic
restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1937, 1938 and
1939. In response, the SS security service concluded a secret
alliance with the clandestine Zionist agency Mossad le-Aliya Bet to
smuggle Jews illegally into Palestine. As a result of this
intensive collaboration, several convoys of ships succeeded in
reaching Palestine past British gunboats. Jewish migration, both
legal and illegal, from Germany (including Austria) to Palestine
increased dramatically in 1938 and 1939. Another 10,000 Jews were
scheduled to depart in October 1939, but the outbreak of war in
September brought the effort to an end. All the same, German
authorities continued to promote indirect Jewish emigration to
Palestine during 1940 and 1941. (30) Even as late as March 1942, at
least one officially authorized Zionist "kibbutz" training camp for
potential emigrants continued to operate in Hitler's Germany.
(31)
The Transfer Agreement
The centerpiece of German-Zionist cooperation during the Hitler
era was the Transfer Agreement, a pact that enabled tens of
thousands of German Jews to migrate to Palestine with their wealth.
The Agreement, also known as the Haavara (Hebrew for "transfer"),
was concluded in August 1933 following talks between German
officials and Chaim Arlosoroff, Political Secretary of the Jewish
Agency, the Palestine center of the World Zionist Organization.
(32)
Through this unusual arrangement, each Jew bound for Palestine
deposited money in a special account in Germany. The money was used
to purchase German-made agricultural tools, building materials,
pumps, fertilizer, and so forth, which were exported to Palestine
and sold there by the Jewish-owned Haavara company in Tel-Aviv.
Money from the sales was given to the Jewish emigrant upon his
arrival in Palestine in an amount corresponding to his deposit in
Germany. German goods poured into Palestine through the Haavara,
which was supplemented a short time later with a barter agreement
by which Palestine oranges were exchanged for German timber,
automobiles, agricultural machinery, and other goods. The Agreement
thus served the Zionist aim of bringing Jewish settlers and
development capital to Palestine, while simultaneously serving the
German goal of freeing the country of an unwanted alien group.
Delegates at the 1933 Zionist Congress in Prague vigorously
debated the merits of the Agreement. Some feared that the pact
would undermine the international Jewish economic boycott against
Germany. But Zionist officials reassured the Congress. Sam Cohen, a
key figure behind the Haavara arrangement, stressed that the
Agreement was not economically advantageous to Germany. Arthur
Ruppin, a Zionist Organization emigration specialist who had helped
negotiate the pact, pointed out that "the Transfer Agreement in no
way interfered with the boycott movement, since no new currency
will flow into Germany as a result of the agreement..." (33) The
1935 Zionist Congress, meeting in Switzerland, overwhelmingly
endorsed the pact. In 1936, the Jewish Agency (the Zionist "shadow
government" in Palestine) took over direct control of the Ha'avara,
which remained in effect until the Second World War forced its
abandonment.
Some German officials opposed the arrangement. Germany's Consul
General in Jerusalem, Hans Döhle, for example, sharply criticized
the Agreement on several occasions during 1937. He pointed out that
it cost Germany the foreign exchange that the products exported to
Palestine through the pact would bring if sold elsewhere. The
Haavara monopoly sale of German goods to Palestine through a Jewish
agency naturally angered German businessmen and Arabs there.
Official German support for Zionism could lead to a loss of German
markets throughout the Arab world. The British government also
resented the arrangement. (34) A June 1937 German Foreign Office
internal bulletin referred to the "foreign exchange sacrifices"
that resulted from the Haavara. (35)
A December 1937 internal memorandum by the German Interior
Ministry reviewed the impact of the Transfer Agreement: "There is
no doubt that the Haavara arrangement has contributed most
significantly to the very rapid development of Palestine since
1933. The Agreement provided not only the largest source of money
(from Germany!), but also the most intelligent group of immigrants,
and finally it brought to the country the machines and industrial
products essential for development." The main advantage of the
pact, the memo reported, was the emigration of large numbers of
Jews to Palestine, the most desirable target country as far as
Germany was concerned. But the paper also noted the important
drawbacks pointed out by Consul Döhle and others. The Interior
Minister, it went on, had concluded that the disadvantages of the
agreement now outweighed the advantages and that, therefore, it
should be terminated. (36)
Only one man could resolve the controversy. Hitler personally
reviewed the policy in July and September 1937, and again in
January 1938, and each time decided to maintain the Haavara
arrangement. The goal of removing Jews from Germany, he concluded,
justified the drawbacks. (37)
The Reich Economics Ministry helped to organize another transfer
company, the International Trade and Investment Agency, or Intria,
through which Jews in foreign countries could help German Jews
emigrate to Palestine. Almost $900,000 was eventually channeled
through the Intria to German Jews in Palestine. (38) Other European
countries eager to encourage Jewish emigration concluded agreements
with the Zionists modeled after the Ha'avara. In 1937 Poland
authorized the Halifin (Hebrew for "exchange") transfer company. By
late summer 1939, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Italy had
signed similar arrangements. The outbreak of war in September 1939,
however, prevented large-scale implementation of these agreements.
(39)
Achievements of Haavara
Between 1933 and 1941, some 60,000 German Jews emigrated to
Palestine through the Ha'avara and other German-Zionist
arrangements, or about ten percent of Germany's 1933 Jewish
population. (These German Jews made up about 15 percent of
Palestine's 1939 Jewish population.) Some Ha'avara emigrants
transferred considerable personal wealth from Germany to Palestine.
As Jewish historian Edwin Black has noted: "Many of these people,
especially in the late 1930s, were allowed to transfer actual
replicas of their homes and factories -- indeed rough replicas of
their very existence." (40)
The total amount transferred from Germany to Palestine through
the Ha'avara between August 1933 and the end of 1939 was 8.1
million pounds or 139.57 million German marks (then equivalent to
more than $40 million). This amount included 33.9 million German
marks ($13.8 million) provided by the Reichsbank in connection with
the Agreement. (41)
Historian Black has estimated that an additional $70 million may
have flowed into Palestine through corollary German commercial
agreements and special international banking transactions. The
German funds had a major impact on a country as underdeveloped as
Palestine was in the 1930s, he pointed out. Several major
industrial enterprises were built with the capital from Germany,
including the Mekoroth waterworks and the Lodzia textile firm. The
influx of Ha'avara goods and capital, concluded Black, "produced an
economic explosion in Jewish Palestine" and was "an indispensable
factor in the creation of the State of Israel." (42)
The Ha'avara agreement greatly contributed to Jewish development
in Palestine and thus, indirectly, to the foundation of the Israeli
state. A January 1939 German Foreign Office circular bulletin
reported, with some misgiving, that "the transfer of Jewish
property out of Germany [through the Ha'avara agreement]
contributed to no small extent to the building of a Jewish state in
Palestine." (43)
Former officials of the Ha'avara company in Palestine confirmed
this view in a detailed study of the Transfer Agreement published
in 1972: "The economic activity made possible by the influx German
capital and the Haavara transfers to the private and public sectors
were of greatest importance for the country's development. Many new
industries and commercial enterprises were established in Jewish
Palestine, and numerous companies that are enormously important
even today in the economy of the State of Israel owe their
existence to the Haavara." (44) Dr. Ludwig Pinner, a Ha'avara
company official in Tel Aviv during the 1930s, later commented that
the exceptionally competent Ha'avara immigrants "decisively
contributed" to the economic, social, cultural and educational
development of Palestine's Jewish community. (45)
The Transfer Agreement was the most far-reaching example of
cooperation between Hitler's Germany and international Zionism.
Through this pact, Hitler's Third Reich did more than any other
government during the 1930s to support Jewish development in
Palestine.
Zionists Offer a Military Alliance With Hitler
In early January 1941 a small but important Zionist organization
submitted a formal proposal to German diplomats in Beirut for a
military-political alliance with wartime Germany. The offer was
made by the radical underground "Fighters for the Freedom of
Israel," better known as the Lehi or Stern Gang. Its leader,
Avraham Stern, had recently broken with the radical nationalist
"National Military Organization" (Irgun Zvai Leumi) over the
group's attitude toward Britain, which had effectively banned
further Jewish settlement of Palestine. Stern regarded Britain as
the main enemy of Zionism.
This remarkable Zionist proposal "for the solution of the Jewish
question in Europe and the active participation of the NMO [Lehi]
in the war on the side of Germany" is worth quoting at some length:
(46)
In their speeches and statements, the leading statesmen of
National Socialist Germany have often emphasized that a New Order
in Europe requires as a prerequisite a radical solution of the
Jewish question by evacuation. ("Jew-free Europe")
The evacuation of the Jewish masses from Europe is a
precondition for solving the Jewish question. However, the only way
this can be totally achieved is through settlement of these masses
in the homeland of the Jewish people, Palestine, and by the
establishment of a Jewish state in its historical boundaries.
The goal of the political activity and the years of struggle by
the Israel Freedom Movement, the National Military Organization in
Palestine (Irgun Zvai Leumi), is to solve the Jewish problem in
this way and thus completely liberate the Jewish people
forever.
The NMO, which is very familiar with the good will of the German
Reich government and its officials towards Zionist activities
within Germany and the Zionist emigration program, takes that view
that:
1. Common interests can exist between a European New Order based
on the German concept and the true national aspirations of the
Jewish people as embodied by the NMO.
2. Cooperation is possible between the New Germany and a
renewed, folkish-national Jewry [Hebr_ertum].
3. The establishment of the historical Jewish state on a
national and totalitarian basis, and bound by treaty with the
German Reich, would be in the interest of maintaining and
strengthening the future German position of power in the Near
East.
On the basis of these considerations, and upon the condition
that the German Reich government recognize the national aspirations
of the Israel Freedom Movement mentioned above, the NMO in
Palestine offers to actively take part in the war on the side of
Germany.
This offer by the NMO could include military, political and
informational activity within Palestine and, after certain
organizational measures, outside as well. Along with this the
Jewish men of Europe would be militarily trained and organized in
military units under the leadership and command of the NMO. They
would take part in combat operations for the purpose of conquering
Palestine, should such a front by formed.
The indirect participation of the Israel Freedom Movement in the
New Order of Europe, already in the preparatory stage, combined
with a positive-radical solution of the European Jewish problem on
the basis of the national aspirations of the Jewish people
mentioned above, would greatly strengthen the moral foundation of
the New Order in the eyes of all humanity.
The cooperation of the Israel Freedom Movement would also be
consistent with a recent speech by the German Reich Chancellor, in
which Hitler stressed that he would utilize any combination and
coalition in order to isolate and defeat England.
Yitzhak Shamir
There is no record of any German response. Acceptance was very
unlikely anyway because by this time German policy was decisively
pro-Arab. (47) Remarkably, Stern's group sought to conclude a pact
with the Third Reich at a time when stories that Hitler was bent on
exterminating Jews were already in wide circulation. Stern
apparently either did not believe the stories or he was willing to
collaborate with the mortal enemy of his people to help bring about
a Jewish state. (48)
An important Lehi member at the time the group made this offer
was Yitzhak Shamir, who later served as Israel's Foreign Minister
and then, during much of the 1980s and until June 1992, as Prime
Minister.
As Lehi operations chief following Stern's death in 1942, Shamir
organized numerous acts of terror, including the November 1944
assassination of British Middle East Minister Lord Moyne and the
September 1948 slaying of Swedish United Nations mediator Count
Bernadotte.
Years later, when Shamir was asked about the 1941 offer, he
confirmed that he was aware of his organization's proposed alliance
with wartime Germany. (49)
Conclusion
In spite of the basic hostility between the Hitler regime and
international Jewry, for several years Jewish Zionist and German
National Socialist interests coincided. In collaborating with the
Zionists for a mutually desirable and humane solution to a complex
problem, the Third Reich was willing to make foreign exchange
sacrifices, impair relations with Britain and anger the Arabs.
Indeed, during the 1930s no nation did more to substantively
further Jewish-Zionist goals than Hitler's Germany.
Notes
(1) W. Martini, "Hebrisch unterm Hakenkreuz," Die Welt
(Hamburg), Jan. 10, 1975. Cited in: Klaus Polken, "The Secret
Contacts: Zionism and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941," Journal of
Palestine Studies, Spring-Summer 1976, p. 65.
(2) Quoted in: Ingrid Weckert, Feuerzeichen: Die
"Reichskristallnacht" (Tübingen: Grabert, 1981), p. 212. See also:
Th. Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: Herzl Press, 1970), pp. 33,
35, 36, and, Edwin Black, The Transfer Agreement (New York:
Macmillan, 1984), p. 73.
(3) Th. Herzl, "Der Kongress," Welt, June 4, 1897. Reprinted in:
Theodor Herzls zionistische Schriften (Leon Kellner, ed.), erster
Teil, Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1920, p. 190 (and p. 139).
(4) Memo of June 21, 1933, in: L. Dawidowicz, A Holocaust Reader
(New York: Behrman, 1976), pp. 150-155, and (in part) in: Francis
R. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (Austin:
Univ. of Texas, 1985), p. 42.; On Zionism in Germany before
Hitler's assumption of power, see: Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in
Weimar Germany (Baton Rouge: 1980), pp. 94-95, 126-131, 140-143.;
F. Nicosia, Third Reich (Austin: 1985), pp. 1-15.
(5) Jüdische Rundschau (Berlin), June 13, 1933. Quoted in: Heinz
H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (New York: Ballantine, pb.,
1971, 1984), pp. 376-377.
(6) Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine,
1971, 1984), p. 376.
(7) "Berlin," Encyclopaedia Judaica (New York and Jerusalem:
1971), Vol. 5, p. 648. For a look at one aspect of this "vigorous
life," see: J.-C. Horak, "Zionist Film Propaganda in Nazi Germany,"
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 4, No. 1,
1984, pp. 49-58.
(8) Francis R. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine
Question (1985), pp. 54-55.; Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to
Auschwitz (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois, 1970, 1990), pp. 178-181.
(9) Jacob Boas, "A Nazi Travels to Palestine," History Today
(London), January 1980, pp. 33-38.
(10) Facsimile reprint of front page of Das Schwarze Korps, May
15, 1935, in: Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Israels Langer Arm (Frankfurt:
Goverts, 1975), pp. 66-67. Also quoted in: Heinz H_hne, The Order
of the Death's Head (Ballantine, 1971, 1984), p. 377. See also:
Erich Kern, ed., Verheimlichte Dokumente (Munich: FZ-Verlag, 1988),
p. 184.
(11) Das Schwarze Korps, Sept. 26, 1935. Quoted in: F. Nicosia,
The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (1985), pp. 56-57.
(12) Lenni Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983),
p. 83.
(13) F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question
(1985), p. 60. See also: F. Nicosia, "The Yishuv and the
Holocaust," The Journal of Modern History (Chicago), Vol. 64, No.
3, Sept. 1992, pp. 533-540.
(14) F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question
(1985), p. 57.
(15) Jüdische Rundschau, Sept. 17, 1935. Quoted in: Yitzhak
Arad, with Y. Gutman and A. Margaliot, eds., Documents on the
Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1981), pp. 82-83.
(16) Der Angriff, Dec. 23, 1935, in: E. Kern, ed., Verheimlichte
Dokumente (Munich: 1988), p. 148.; F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985),
p. 56.; L. Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983), p.
138.; A. Margaliot, "The Reaction...," Yad Vashem Studies
(Jerusalem), vol. 12, 1977, pp. 90-91.; On Kareski's remarkable
career, see: H. Levine, "A Jewish Collaborator in Nazi Germany,"
Central European History (Atlanta), Sept. 1975, pp. 251-281.
(17) "Dr. Wise Urges Jews to Declare Selves as Such," New York
Herald Tribune, June 13, 1938, p. 12.
(18) F. Nicosia, The Third Reich (1985), p. 53.
(19) Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New
York: Bantam, pb., 1976), pp. 253-254.; Max Nussbaum, "Zionism
Under Hitler," Congress Weekly (New York: American Jewish
Congress), Sept. 11, 1942.; F. Nicosia, The Third Reich (1985), pp.
58-60, 217.; Edwin Black, The Transfer Agreement (1984), p.
175.
(20) H. H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine, pb.,
1984), pp. 380-382.; K. Schleunes, Twisted Road (1970, 1990), p.
226.; Secret internal SS intelligence report about F. Polkes, June
17, 1937, in: John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust (New York:
Garland, 1982), vol. 5, pp. 62-64.
(21) F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 63-64, 105,
219-220.
(22) F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), p. 160.
(23) This distinction is also implicit in the "Balfour
Declaration" of November 1917, in which the British government
expressed support for "a national home for the Jewish people" in
Palestine, while carefully avoiding any mention of a Jewish state.
Referring to the majority Arab population there, the Declaration
went on to caution, "...it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The complete text of
the Declaration is reproduced in facsimile in: Robert John, Behind
the Balfour Declaration (IHR, 1988), p. 32.
(24) F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), p. 121.
(25) F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), p. 124.
(26) David Yisraeli, The Palestine Problem in German Politics
1889-1945 (Bar-Ilan University, Israel, 1974), p. 300.; Also in:
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. 5. Doc. No. 564
or 567.
(27) K. Schleunes, The Twisted Road (1970, 1990), p. 209.
(28) Circular of January 25, 1939. Nuremberg document 3358-PS.
International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg: 1947-1949),
vol. 32, pp. 242-243. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington,
DC: 1946-1948), vol. 6, pp. 92-93.
(29) F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 141-144.; On Hitler's
critical view of Zionism in Mein Kampf, see esp. Vol. 1, Chap. 11.
Quoted in: Robert Wistrich, Hitler's Apocalypse (London: 1985), p.
155.; See also: F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 26-28.; Hitler
told his army adjutant in 1939 and again in 1941 that he had asked
the British in 1937 about transferring all of Germany's Jews to
Palestine or Egypt. The British rejected the proposal, he said,
because it would cause further disorder. See: H. v. Kotze, ed.,
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler (Stuttgart: 1974), pp. 65, 95.
(30) F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 156, 160-164, 166-167.;
H. H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine, pb., 1984),
pp. 392-394.; Jon and David Kimche, The Secret Roads (London:
Secker and Warburg, 1955), pp. 39-43. See also: David Yisraeli,
"The Third Reich and Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies, October
1971, p. 347.; Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe,
1939-1945 (1979), pp. 43, 49, 52, 60.; T. Kelly, "Man who fooled
Nazis," Washington Times, April 28, 1987, pp. 1B, 4B. Based on
interview with Willy Perl, author of The Holocaust Conspiracy.
(31) Y. Arad, et al., eds., Documents On the Holocaust (1981),
p. 155. (The training kibbutz was at Neuendorf, and may have
functioned even after March 1942.)
(32) On the Agreement in general, see: Werner Feilchenfeld, et
al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck,
1972).; David Yisraeli, "The Third Reich and the Transfer
Agreement," Journal of Contemporary History (London), No. 2, 1971,
pp. 129-148.; "Haavara," Encyclopaedia Judaica (1971), vol. 7, pp.
1012-1013.; F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question
(Austin: 1985), pp. 44-49.; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the
European Jews (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), pp. 140-141.; The
Transfer Agreement, by Edwin Black, is detailed and useful.
However, it contains numerous inaccuracies and wildly erroneous
conclusions. See, for example, the review by Richard S. Levy in
Commentary, Sept. 1984, pp. 68-71.
(33) E. Black, The Transfer Agreement (1984), pp. 328, 337.
(34) On opposition to the Haavara in official German circles,
see: W. Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina
(1972), pp. 31-33.; D. Yisraeli, "The Third Reich," Journal of
Contemporary History, 1971, pp. 136-139.; F. Nicosia, The Third
Reich and the Palestine Question, pp. 126-139.; I. Weckert,
Feuerzeichen (1981), pp. 226-227.; Rolf Vogel, Ein Stempel hat
gefehlt (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1977), pp. 110 ff.
(35) W. Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer (1972), p. 31.
Entire text in: David Yisraeli, The Palestine Problem in German
Politics 1889-1945 (Israel: 1974), pp. 298-300.
(36) Interior Ministry internal memo (signed by State Secretary
W. Stuckart), Dec. 17, 1937, in: Helmut Eschwege, ed., Kennzeichen
J (Berlin: 1966), pp. 132-136.
(37) W. Feilchenfeld, et al, Haavara-Transfer (1972), p. 32.
(38) E. Black, Transfer Agreement, pp. 376-377.
(39) E. Black, Transfer Agreement (1984), pp. 376, 378.; F.
Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 238-239 (n. 91).
(40) E. Black, Transfer Agreement, p. 379.; F. Nicosia, Third
Reich, pp. 212, 255 (n. 66).
(41) W. Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer, p. 75.;
"Haavara," Encyclopaedia Judaica, (1971), Vol. 7, p. 1013.
(42) E. Black, Transfer Agreement, pp. 379, 373, 382.
(43) Circular of January 25, 1939. Nuremberg document 3358-PS.
International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg: 1947-1949),
Vol. 32, pp. 242-243.
(44) Werner Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach
Palaestina (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1972). Quoted in: Ingrid
Weckert, Feuerzeichen (Tübingen: Grabert, 1981), pp. 222-223.
(45) W. Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina
(1972). Quoted in: I. Weckert, Feuerzeichen (1981), p. 224.
(46) Original document in German Ausw_rtiges Amt Archiv, Bestand
47-59, E 224152 and E 234155-58. (Photocopy in author's
possession).; Complete original German text published in: David
Yisraeli, The Palestine Problem in German Politics 1889-1945
(Israel: 1974), pp. 315-317. See also: Klaus Polkhen, "The Secret
Contacts," Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring-Summer 1976, pp.
78-80.; (At the time this offer was made, Stern's Lehi group still
regarded itself as the true Irgun/NMO.)
(47) Arab nationalists opposed Britain, which then dominated
much of the Arab world, including Egypt, Iraq and Palestine.
Because Britain and Germany were at war, Germany cultivated Arab
support. The leader of Palestine's Arabs, the Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini, worked closely with Germany during
the war years. After escaping from Palestine, he spoke to the Arab
world over German radio and helped raise Muslim recruits in Bosnia
for the Waffen SS.
(48) Israel Shahak, "Yitzhak Shamir, Then and Now," Middle East
Policy (Washington, DC), Vol. 1, No. 1, (Whole No. 39), 1992, pp.
27-38.; Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour (New York: Harper
and Row, 1988), pp. 213-214. Quoted in: Andrew J. Hurley, Israel
and the New World Order (Santa Barbara, Calif.: 1991), pp. 93,
208-209.; Avishai Margalit, "The Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir,"
New York Review of Books, May 14, 1992, pp. 18-24.; Lenni Brenner,
Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983), pp. 266-269.; L.
Brenner, Jews in America Today (1986), pp. 175-177.; L. Brenner,
"Yitzhak Shamir: On Hitler's Side," Arab Perspectives (League of
Arab States), March 1984, pp. 11-13.
(49) Avishai Margalit, "The Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir," New
York Review of Books, May 14, 1992, pp. 18-24.; Lenni Brenner,
Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983), pp. 266-269.; L.
Brenner, Jews in America Today (1986), pp. 175-177.; L. Brenner,
"Skeletons in Shamir's Cupboard," Middle East International, Sept.
30, 1983, pp. 15-16.; Sol Stern, L. Rapoport, "Israel's Man of the
Shadows," Village Voice (New York), July 3, 1984, pp. 13 ff.
Bibliographic information
Author: Weber, Mark
Title: Zionism and the Third Reich
Source: The
Journal for Historical Review, PO Box 2739, Newport Beach,
CA 92659, USA. (http://www.ihr.org)
Date: July/August
1993. Issue: Volume 13, number 4. Location: page 29. ISSN:
0195-6752